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Abstract
Structural realists in political science and some rationalist legal scholars argue that
customary international law cannot affect state behavior: that it is “epiphenomenal.” This article
develops a game theoretic model of a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma in the customary
international law context that shows that it is plausible that states would comply with customary
international law under certain circumstances. Our model shows that these circumstances relate
to: (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively
involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of
cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has
characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network good, (iv) the information
available to the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of
states in valuing the benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the
expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are
also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships between the involved states.
This model shows that customary international law is plausible in the sense that it may
well affect state behavior where certain conditions are met. It shows what types of contexts,
including malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to produce and comply
with customary international law. This article identifies a number of empirical strategies that
may be used to test the model.
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1. Introduction
Customary international law (CIL) is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal
and doctrinally incoherent. By contrast, the central argument of this article is that CIL,
while something of a feat of levitation, is theoretically plausible in the sense that it may
well affect state behavior in certain circumstances. CIL is a feat of levitation insofar as it
rests not on a rock-solid natural law basis of divine principles, but on a fabric of rational
acts, woven through a multiplicity of relations over time. Our argument makes one
central claim: that while there are limits on and variations in the effectiveness of CIL,
there are circumstances where it may independently affect the behavior of states. There
is no reason in theory, or in data adduced by others, to believe CIL generally
epiphenomenal. As CIL is the foundation of all international law, this article suggests the
circumstances under which we would expect international law to affect state behavior.
This article refines and extends an emerging rationalist understanding of CIL.1
Pioneering work in this field, notably that of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, has begun
to articulate a rationalist theory of CIL. Goldsmith and Posner have argued that CIL does
not affect state behavior.2 We show why this assertion is either tautological or incorrect
as a matter of theory, and, to the extent that it purports to rely on factual observation, is
not supported by the data presented.3 We construct a more complete model that shows
that Goldsmith and Posner’s assumption that the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma is
unlikely to allow CIL to affect state behavior is false.
The tautology of the Goldsmith-Posner argument arises from a false dichotomy
between motivation by self-interest4 and motivation by law. In a rationalist model,
behavior is assumed to be motivated by self-interest. If law is artificially separated from
self-interest, then of course a rationalist model would assume that law has no motivating
force. Yet we show how CIL rules may modify the payoffs associated with relevant
behavior, and thereby affect behavior through self-interest. CIL may affect behavior,
1
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By “self-interest” we mean merely to refer to maximization of preferences—these preferences could be
other-regarding or altruistic.

even if it only does so at the margins. While CIL is endogenous to states as a group,
meaning that it is not a vertical structure produced outside or above the group of states, it
is an independent (exogenous) influence on the behavior of each individual state.
Goldsmith and Posner also assert that CIL is internally incoherent, as states are
not motivated by opinio juris to comply with CIL. However, our analysis provides a
plausible basis to assign a discriminating role to opinio juris, and therefore we find CIL
doctrine internally coherent in at least its core dimension. We understand opinio juris as
a way of referring to the intent of states to propose or accept a rule of law that will serve
as the focal point of behavior, will implicate an important set of default rules that are
applicable to law and not to other types of social order, and that will implicate an
important set of linkages among legal rules.
This article develops a repeated multilateral5 prisoner’s dilemma6 model of CIL.
Of course, game theory can never capture all real-world detail with its highly nuanced
decision-making.7 The purpose of game-theoretic models is not to predict or prescribe
behavior, but to generate testable hypotheses that, once tested, are expected to tell us
something useful about the world.8
Our analysis focuses on the parameters of the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma in
the CIL context. These parameters include: (i) the relative value of cooperation versus
defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which
increasing the number of states involved increases the value of cooperation or the
detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a
commons problem, a public good, or a network good,9 (iv) the information available to
the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states
in valuing the benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi)
the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether
there are also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships between the
involved states.
5

In this context, we use the term “multilateral” to refer to contexts in which more than two parties are
involved. A more technical term would be “n-person.”
6
The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a form of game commonly used in social science analysis. In this article, it
serves as a vehicle for providing a formalized analogy to the CIL context. The structure and assumptions
that characterize the prisoner’s dilemma are described in parts 2 and 3 below.
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See the cautions expressed in Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 1, and the broader treatment in
Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY (1986).
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While it may be argued that the game theory that we use, initially developed in the context of analysis of
individual behavior, cannot be applied to state behavior, it should be noted that game theory has been
applied to behavior of firms, as well as states. For an argument regarding the adaptation of these types of
models to international law, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1999).
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“Commons problems” are circumstances where persons share a particular resource, and one person’s
use of the resource may reduce the amount of the resource available to others, while conservation of the
resource may increase the amount of the resource available to all. A fishery may present a commons
problem in this sense. “Public goods” are goods that are available to all, where one person’s use of the
good does not diminish its availability to others. Networks in this context involve circumstances where
wider use of the same good makes the good more valuable to all. Standards often have this characteristic.

The parameters we identify are incorporated in our model as independent
variables, but from a normative standpoint it is possible for policy initiatives to select or
manipulate these parameters. That is, by identifying the parameters for determining
whether CIL will affect state behavior, this article opens the way to normative
institutional design. States may determine to restructure certain institutions in order to
facilitate the formation and operation of CIL. There may be circumstances under which
it will be normatively attractive to facilitate the development of CIL, rather than to
engage in more self-conscious and static treaty-making. The institutional dynamism and
social immanence that make social norms attractive in the domestic context may also be
attractive in at least some international contexts.
This article is organized as follows. The remainder of this introduction provides a
short doctrinal review of CIL and briefly locates this article in relation to four literatures:
law and economics, social norms, international organization and industrial organization.
Our model is largely based on earlier work in these areas. Part 2 explains our choice of
the repeated multilateral prisoner’s dilemma as the basis for our model, as well as our
choice of an assumed strategy for players within this model. Any game theory model
depends on decisions to assume certain game structures and strategies. We explain here
why the prisoner’s dilemma game provides a good fit for the CIL context, and how we
choose an assumed strategy for states to follow. Part 3 explains the other assumptions
and parameters of our model. Part 4 sets forth four illustrative examples of CIL contexts
that might be understood in terms of our model. Part 5 sets forth the general structure
and implications of our model, while Appendix I sets forth the formal model. Part 6
presents some implications of this article. Part 7 briefly concludes.
In brief, this article has important implications regarding the plausibility of CIL,
the possibility of institutional change to facilitate CIL in particular areas, our
understanding of CIL doctrine, and future research in CIL. On the basis of a complete
rationalist model, articulated in formal terms in Appendix I, we show the parameters that
will determine states’ compliance with CIL. These parameters include especially (i) the
relative patience of individual states to wait for the benefits of reciprocal compliance by
other states, (ii) the importance of the frequency of interaction and of the duration of
interaction in order to increase the potential value of future reciprocal benefits, (iii) the
possibility that compliance in one setting may be supported by overlapping relationships
in other settings, (iv) the structure of the benefits from cooperation, including whether
benefits may increase or decrease with the number of states that cooperate. Based on this
understanding, states may create institutional responses in order to enhance the
possibilities of compliance with particular rules of CIL.
But CIL is not merely a label for rational cooperation. Rather, CIL is a special
branch of cooperation that has particular features. These features include the
establishment of a focal point so that states may readily identify what will “count” as
cooperation, attention to the motivation of states to offer and accept a rule of law (opinio
juris), with certain default rules and prescribed consequences, and the linkage of the
particular rule with the broader international legal system. In this last regard, we might

say that by including a particular rule in CIL, states are accepting that the rest of the legal
system is hostage to compliance with the particular rule. This adds strong incentives for
compliance. Yet this is only the beginning of a rationalist research program in CIL.
Theory such as the one articulated in this article must be tested and refined based on
empirical observation. By articulating a set of parameters for determining the likelihood
of compliance, this article also suggests the contours of a broader research program in
CIL.
a. Customary International Law and its Doctrine
As an introductory matter, it is useful to review the fundamental doctrine of CIL.
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, listing the sources of
international law applicable by the Court, includes “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.” Article 102 of the American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that “[c]ustomary international law
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.” The sense of obligation is referred to in Latin as “opinio juris sive
necessitatis.”
CIL has two core doctrinal problems relating to opinio juris. First, can CIL ever
come into existence if it requires opinio juris—a sense of legal obligation—before it can
exist? The second, related, problem relates to the motivation of states. Are states ever
motivated by opinio juris? The rationalist assumption that states are motivated by their
own preferences seems prima facie inconsistent with the CIL requirement of motivation
by opinio juris, and this is the criticism that Goldsmith and Posner level at CIL
doctrine.10 They argue that what appears to be CIL is not, because it is actually
motivated by coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation predicated on self-interest, or
coordination predicated on self-interest. We respond to this argument in part 6.
As suggested above, for the social scientist studying law, the critical descriptive
question relates to the effects of legal rules on behavior. For CIL, this descriptive
question is also a doctrinal question, as CIL doctrine requires some level of generality
and consistency of practice—some quantum of state behavior. And again, at least under
the Restatement formulation, this behavior must be motivated by opinio juris. Under the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, the custom itself may serve as evidence of
acceptance as law, of opinio juris. Some commentators have suggested that opinio juris
in a formal sense may not be necessary at all, but that the requirement should be
understood in terms of state consent or acceptance.11
As we address the theory of CIL, it is useful to have in mind some examples of
CIL. CIL exists in a wide variety of fields, and coexists in many areas with treaty law.
As already noted, CIL is its own foundation. Thus, there is a CIL of CIL. In other
words, the CIL doctrine discussed above is understood as law pursuant to CIL.
10
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Furthermore, the law of treaties came into existence pursuant to CIL, although this law is
today codified in treaty. But moving beyond these foundational areas, CIL addresses, for
example, issues of territorial integrity, jurisdiction to apply law, diplomatic immunity, the
rights of states with respect to coastal areas, human rights, cross-border pollution and the
use of force to settle international disputes.
These are diverse fields, each with its own characteristics. Our theoretical
approach calls for discrimination among these fields: not all CIL is created equal. Not
all law is equally or peremptorily binding. Our model indicates the parameters for
discrimination. Simply put, we would expect greater possibility for formation of and
compliance with CIL in some fields than in others. Of course, this is an area in which
empiricism would require analysis of areas in which CIL has not developed: the dog that
did not bark. Thus, we might ask, why is there no CIL rule that requires extradition of
criminals?
Our theoretical approach also accepts the possibility of linkage among diverse
fields, integrating and therefore homogenizing the behavioral effect of each rule of law.
b. Four Literatures
This article draws on four semi-autonomous literatures. First, as noted above,
there is an emerging rationalist, law and economics-based literature of CIL. The leading
work in this area is by Goldsmith and Posner, but there are other important contributions.
Second, this article draws on a burgeoning literature on social norms in the law, although
social norms are studied by all manner of social scientists. Third, this article draws on
the economics field of industrial organization for game theory-based insights about
collusion among competitors in markets. Fourth, this article draws on the political
science literature of international organization, which has addressed in detail the game
theoretic analysis of cooperation among groups of states.
i. Law and Economics of CIL
Goldsmith and Posner provide a game theoretic analysis of CIL. They examine a
variety of CIL circumstances, and argue that these circumstances can be categorized into
four game types: (i) coincidence of interest, (ii) coercion, (iii) bilateral cooperation, and
(iv) bilateral coordination. This is a useful exercise, as it invites us to consider the
motivation of states, and the degree to which CIL affects behavior. In the perhaps
hypothetical cases of pure coincidence of interest and pure coercion, Goldsmith and
Posner are correct that there can be no opinio juris, and that law does little work. This is
not new to CIL doctrine, but it is useful to emphasize. It is also worth noting that
Goldsmith and Posner seem to assume a purity of motivation that may not exist in the
real world.
Goldsmith and Posner suggest that many instances of observed CIL may be
understood in terms of bilateral cooperation along the lines of a bilateral prisoner’s
dilemma game. They then argue that “Although game theory does not rule out the

possibility of n-state cooperation, the assumptions required for such an outcome are quite
strong and usually unrealistic. For this reason, we doubt the utility of n-player prisoner's
dilemmas as an explanation for multilateral or ‘universal’ behavioral regularities.”12
Their views with respect to coordination games are similar. The present article shows
that the assumptions for multilateral or “n-state” cooperation are neither strong nor
unrealistic, but are in some cases quite plausible.
In addition to developing this theoretical perspective, Goldsmith and Posner
examine several examples of CIL. The areas they consider are neutrality, diplomatic
immunity and maritime jurisdiction. They believe that in these areas, states were
motivated by coincidence of interest, coercion or a bilateral reciprocity along the lines of
the prisoner’s dilemma. They conclude that if state behavior can be explained by
coincidence of interest or coercion, or any other self-interested-motivation, then neither
opinio juris nor CIL does any motivational work.
ii. Social Norms
We might ask, however, whether the CIL problem is different in structure from
the social norms context, and whether if social norms can affect behavior, CIL can as
well. Since the publication by Robert Ellickson of Order Without Law13 in 1991, legal
scholars have examined the role of informal norms in society, and the relationship of
these norms to law. Ellickson investigates how cattle farmers in Shasta County,
California, manage to establish and apply their own non-legal rules, with a notable level
of compliance, without direct intervention by the state. It is an insightful story about how
order can arise without law, or in spite of law.14
We may draw a rough, and limited, analogy between the development of social
norms in a municipal, or private setting,15 and the development of CIL in the international
public setting. In the international community, CIL is substantively similar to the
phenomenon Ellickson describes.16 In international political science, regime theorists
such as Robert Keohane,17 Stephen Krasner, and Beth Simmons18 have told a similar
story of the possible rise of order in international society. However, regime theory has
12
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1971).
17
See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
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Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491 (1987).
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generally avoided CIL.19 Moreover, recognition that a rule has become part of CIL may
signal its support by, or linkage with, the multi-sector international legal system. This
system of accepted and enforced linkage may distinguish legal rules from non-legal
regimes.
The difference between law and social norms in the municipal setting is that law
is the province of the state (setting aside for the moment religious law, other non-state
rules, and circumstances in which non-state made rules are incorporated in the stateenforced law).20 However, this distinction is inapposite to the international system,
which has been characterized as a horizontal, as opposed to vertical, system, where there
is no overarching state, per se.21 So, in the international system, there is more overlap,
and an indistinct border, between law and social norms. This overlap is perhaps easier to
see in the international context than in the domestic context, as, in the international
context, a significant subset of social norms is termed "law."
Ellickson states that the social norms literature defines a “social norm” as “a rule
governing an individual’s behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely
enforce by means of social sanctions.”22 The focus of this definition on decentralized
means of enforcement shows the strong analogy between social norms in the municipal
setting and CIL in the international setting. Of course, to the extent that international
courts may apply, and institutions of global governance may enforce, CIL, there is a
difference. But this application and enforceability is quite limited. There are few
circumstances in which CIL rules benefit from mandatory adjudication in international
tribunals. We would not consider application of CIL by domestic courts to amount to the
action of “state agents” at the international level, although action by domestic courts
would certainly be considered action of “state agents” at the municipal level. This is
because in the international context, domestic courts are simply internal deliberative
processes of national governments. The application by domestic courts of CIL may be
understood as a kind of norm internalization.23
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Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 124
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Robert Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in SOCIAL
NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). Note that Ellickson assumes multilateral, as
opposed to bilateral, retaliation.
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See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
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INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)). This internalization may be desirable under certain
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another to harness their domestic legal system for certain of their international legal obligations, effectively
holding the domestic legal system hostage. See also Philip Moremen & Joel P. Trachtman, Whose Right is
it Anyway? Private Parties in EC-U.S. Dispute Settlement at the WTO, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 221 (2003).

One important set of explanations of social norms understands norms as
preferences that individuals (or in our case states) acquire through education,
acculturation or other processes, such as an expressive or articulation function.24 It may
well be possible to modify preferences of states through social norms. It seems obvious
that the way to modify the preferences of states is to modify the preferences of individual
government officials, or voters. Indeed, it may be appropriate to consider epistemic
communities and networks among government officials as channels of preferencemodification. While this approach may have traction in the CIL setting, and may reemphasize the role of arguments predicated on legitimacy, justice and morality as bases
for preference-modification, this article will bypass that discussion, and focus on
exogenous explanations of social norms, that is, explanations that look at external
influences on actors, rather than internal changes in actors.25 Modeling always involves
simplification, and our goal in this article is to elaborate a rationalist model for future
testing. In fact, testing an exogenous model would help to advance the debate between
exogenous and endogenous causes of compliance with CIL.
In connection with exogenous explanations, the law-based social norms literature
has not embraced the repeated multilateral prisoner’s dilemma.26 This is due to two types
of concerns. First, there are concerns that game theory does not reflect the nuance of
social interaction. We hope that the incorporation in our model of multi-sector contact
helps to address this concern. Second, there are concerns regarding the credibility of
third-party enforcement.27 Will third parties be properly motivated to join in retaliation
against violators? If the threat of retaliation is not credible, there will be strong
incentives for violation. We address these concerns below.
iii. Industrial Organization
Much of our understanding of the utility, structure and dynamics of multilateral
prisoner’s dilemma games comes from the economics literature of industrial
organization. This literature considers the possibility that firms may enter into cartels or
other restrictions of competition that violate antitrust laws. While firms may find
opportunities to communicate, their communications and agreements must be kept secret
from the regulatory authorities and are not enforceable at law. This legal restraint on the
enforcement of agreements is analogous to the limitation in the international law setting
on enforcement of agreements. An important concern for industrial organization
24
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CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2003). Mahoney and Sanchirico explain the state of the social norms literature
with respect to the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma. They explain that the objection to these models is that
third party enforcement is not individually rational: that the players lack incentives to retaliate.
27
Id. at note 12, citing work by Ellickson, Katz, McAdams and Posner.
25

economists is to identify circumstances under which agreements can be made selfsustaining through the self-interest of the parties to the agreement.
While the analogy is apparent, we must recognize, of course, that in the CIL
setting, public communication is possible, as are agreements that at least purport to be
binding: treaties. The degree to which agreements may actually constrain behavior is a
question for another article, but we point out that the international legal rule that treaties
must be observed (pacta sunt servanda) is itself part of CIL.
Another, perhaps more important, distinction is that a cartel has certain
characteristics that may differ from any particular CIL setting. That is, in a cartel, the
more others adhere to the cartel, the greater the monetary incentives for any particular
member to defect. This context is more like a commons problem than like a public good
or network problem. We will discuss some of these distinctions based on variations in
payoff structures below.
iv. International Organization
Political scientists and economists working in the field of international
organization have made a good deal of progress in analyzing the problem of international
cooperation more generally. In various works, they have examined most of the
parameters that we utilize here.28 This literature has not examined CIL. The model we
present here formalizes certain considerations that remain informal in much of the
political science literature, and has other distinctive features that we describe below.
We have structured our model to match most closely the CIL context, rather than
attempt to structure a model that would address other international cooperation devices.
However, we recognize that the question of which device—treaty, CIL or softer law—
itself depends on a set of variables. We also recognize that CIL may be understood as a
phase in the formalization of law, or in “legalization.”29 The International Law
Commission of the United Nations often codifies CIL, and CIL often forms the basis for
treaties. This article does not present an explanation of choice between custom and
treaty, or of the relationship among these instruments.30
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2. The Multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game theory develops models to depict, to abstract, and to formalize, various
social settings. Given the diversity of social contexts, there is a wide choice of models
from which to choose.31 In this section we explain our choice of the multilateral
prisoner’s dilemma as the basic model for the CIL problem, examine the potential
strategies that might be played within this game, and explain some of our assumptions.
The multilateral repeated prisoner’s dilemma is itself really a group of varying models,
with a number of varying features, including the number of players and their preferences.
a. Choice of Game
The basic payoff structure assumed in the prisoner’s dilemma game captures the
essential problem of cooperation in a horizontal social setting with externalities,32 in
which parties have a choice between compliance and defection, and in which they can
enrich themselves individually through defection while they could enrich society, and in
light of the anticipated actions of others, themselves, through compliance.33 Of course,
some CIL contexts might be better modeled using other methods, but by using the
prisoner’s dilemma we hope to capture the essence of informal contracting under opposed
interests.34
One of the reasons that we choose this game is because it allows us to
contextualize a number of insights and concerns that cannot easily be included in other
analytical models. For example, we believe that the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma can
577 (1992); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 346-47
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take account of a number of the diverse considerations often referred to together as
“reputation” or “reputational sanctions.”35 We also believe that the multilateral
prisoner’s dilemma must be at the core of a rationalist explanation of the effectiveness of
social norms. Finally, we believe that the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma offers
parsimony: in the CIL context, the factors that it takes into account seem necessary, and
there are no factors that seem superfluous.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a non-cooperative game, meaning that the players are
unable to enter into binding agreements with one another. Although treaties are binding
in a formal legal sense, as the source of their binding force is CIL itself, it seems
appropriate at the outset to model CIL as a non-cooperative game. However, it may be
appropriate to relax the assumption that the general international legal context is a noncooperative game once we determine that the CIL of pacta sunt servanda has binding
force, lending binding force to treaties. While this is critical to treaty law, it should be
emphasized that it does not affect our analysis of CIL.
Thus, in a non-cooperative, single-play circumstance, with a standard prisoner’s
dilemma payoff structure, we would expect non-compliance.36 This is each player’s
dominant strategy, meaning that each player’s payoff from defection is superior to its
payoff from cooperation, no matter what the other player does. This dominant strategy is
illustrated in the table below, in which no matter what State B does, State A obtains a
better payoff by defecting.37
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

State

Cooperate

State B
Cooperate

Defect

3;3

1;4

A
[sum=6]

Defect

4;1

2;2
[sum=4]
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Therefore, under the rather restrictive assumptions of the true prisoner’s dilemma,
the parties each invariably choose the strategy that results in reduced individual welfare,
and reduced aggregate welfare, compared to the non-defecting strategy. This is an
inefficient outcome. By analogy, states playing the CIL game (assuming prisoner’s
dilemma-type payoffs) in a bilateral single-play setting would fail to form or comply with
a CIL rule that increased individual and aggregate welfare. Cooperation is strongly
dominated, and the resulting equilibrium is for both states to defect.38 The same is true of
a prisoner’s dilemma game repeated a finite number of times known in advance to the
players. Again, the unique resulting equilibrium is for each player to defect in each
period.39
This conclusion is inescapable in theory, given the constraints of the game: by
definition, the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game is an inefficient strategic
equilibrium. This conclusion presents a normative goal: to modify the real world
circumstances so as to produce stable equilibria that are efficient. This is the major role
of CIL, and of international law generally.
Of course, in a world of effective third-party enforcement of agreements, the
response to the prisoner’s dilemma is clear: the parties would enter into a binding
agreement to cooperate, thereby modifying the payoff structure and escaping the
prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma assumes, however, that its prisoners are
held separately, and cannot negotiate, reach, or enforce a binding agreement.
In the CIL setting, there is no court of general mandatory jurisdiction nor any
publicly appointed “policeman.” While we may draw analogies to the World Court and
the U.N., these institutions have substantial differences compared to domestic courts and
police. Therefore, we begin by assuming that there is no capacity to make agreements
that are binding. This is obviously a simplifying assumption. In fact, our model is meant
to show that there are substitutes for formal binding agreements, and that these informal
substitutes may have binding force. Once the capacity to bind is established, the players
are no longer in a prisoner’s dilemma.
In the CIL game, there are four additional important distinctions from the
assumptions of non-cooperative game theory in general, and the prisoner’s dilemma in
particular. First, the players can communicate with one another, and can do so more
readily today than during the classical period of formation of CIL. Second, states play a
repeated game with one another with no defined end date, and so can respond at a later
time to something done at an earlier time. Updating of information and punishment are
possible. Third, not only is the narrow game characterized by a particular CIL rule, like
the three-mile territorial sea, but it is embedded in a dense fabric of relationships. Fourth,
information regarding compliance is often readily accessible; more so today, it would
appear, than during the 19th century. Each of these distinctions alone may be sufficient to
38
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transform the game into something quite different from the prisoner’s dilemma—while
nothing resolves the true prisoner’s dilemma, modifications may result in stable and
efficient equilibria. Indeed, it may be useful to use cooperative game theory to analyze
some CIL circumstances.40
As will be illustrated below, one of the more difficult types of multilateral
cooperation problem is a commons problem in which, as in the cartel context, incentives
to defect increase with the number of other states that comply. The more that the
common is protected, the greater the benefits of defecting. Where incentives to defect
increase with the number of players, we would expect the most severe challenge to
cooperation. Not all CIL contexts exhibit this characteristic.
Observation suggests that even certain commons problems, or other prisoner’s
dilemma-type circumstances, may achieve resolution despite theory. Elinor Ostrom
states that “[a] substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that selfinterested individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and
the reality that such cooperative behavior is widespread, although far from inevitable.”41
Ostrom cites considerable evidence regarding the amount and circumstances of
cooperation by individuals in multilateral collective action problems. The evidence
shows that individuals contribute to the resolution of these problems in substantially
greater amounts than the standard prisoner’s dilemma model would suggest. Of course,
much of the evidence is obtained in circumstances where the assumptions of the
prisoner’s dilemma are violated—by allowing individuals to communicate, enter into
agreements and repeat play.
We do not deploy any statistically significant data in this article. However, we
advance a plausible theory of potential efficient equilibria in the multilateral prisoner’s
dilemma, and suggest some possible approaches to empirical testing.
b. Choice of Strategy
The next step in constructing our model is to postulate a plausible strategy that
states might play within the prisoner’s dilemma. There are many choices. We mention
three strategies of retaliation derived from the literature of game theory: tit-for-tat, grim
trigger, and penance. These strategies are stylized assumptions about state behavior, and
they are necessary in order to complete the model. However, the reader will see that
these strategies seem like plausible state responses to defection by others in particular
circumstances. There are two ways in which retaliation might occur: the harmed state
alone retaliates (bilateral retaliation) or the broader community of states retaliate
(multilateral retaliation). In section 4 below, we discuss the possibility of bilateral or
multilateral retaliation, and how this choice would affect our model.
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i. Tit-for-Tat
Under “tit-for-tat,” states may respond to defection with a single defection. Titfor-tat is one of the most frequently-discussed strategies in connection with repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas. While tit-for-tat may win evolutionary games,42 it is not credible:
after a defection, the wronged state will have incentives to accept an undertaking from
the defecting state that it will cooperate in future.43 Even more devastating to tit-for-tat is
the fact that once one state defects the game cycles endlessly between defection and
compliance.44 Given the implausibility of tit-for-tat, we reject it and do not evaluate the
implications of its use.
ii. Grim Trigger
Second, states may respond to a single defection with defection forever: a “grim
trigger” strategy. There are two basic approaches that have been developed in the theory
of repeated games. The first assumes that any deviation is met with a response that
maximizes the loss that the deviator suffers – a “minmax” strategy – even if this imposes
costs on the punishers. The second approach assumes that deviation results in reversion
to the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma game: defection. We adopt the latter
approach since it appears to be more appealing to players. Essentially, we assume that in
the event of deviation the states revert to the strategies that they would have adopted if no
CIL rule had developed in the first place. The grim trigger strategy is credible, as it calls
for a reversion to the dominant strategy of defection in response to an initial defection.
However, the grim trigger strategy is unappealing for the same reason that failure
to resolve the prisoner’s dilemma of cooperation is unappealing: it results in
inefficiency.45 Thus, in his work on treaties relating to environmental commons
problems,46 Barrett rejects the grim trigger strategy because it fails to satisfy the criterion
of collective rationality. The collective rationality consideration is a formal articulation
of the intuitive concern that it would be extraordinarily wasteful to abandon an efficient
multilateral agreement because of a single defection. While it would be individually
rational to respond with defection forever—it simply calls for reversion to the Nash
equilibrium—it is collectively irrational insofar as rational negotiators will have
incentives to renegotiate a cooperative arrangement after defection. Therefore, it is not
credible.
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With respect to the more empirical question of whether a grim trigger strategy is
actually used, if we think not about the CIL that exists, but about the CIL that does not
exist, it is clear that states do play the grim trigger strategy at least in some contexts. In
fact, one might argue that the grim trigger is the existing default strategy in CIL. That is,
where a CIL rule exists or is proposed for formation, and one state deviates, that may be
sufficient provocation to cause others to deviate forever in response: to kill the rule
multilaterally.
The grim trigger strategy is not credible because it is not “renegotiation-proof.”47
That is, after a defection, non-defecting states will have incentives to come together and
cooperate with the defector, depriving the grim trigger of credibility and therefore
effectiveness. The defector can make an appealing “let bygones be bygones” argument.48
An obvious counterargument to this, of course, is that renegotiation unravels if states
perceive that this argument may be made repeatedly. That is, once the players understand
that defection and promises of future compliance will go on indefinitely, would they not
decline to renegotiate the first time? Moreover, in the CIL context, we are operating on
the assumption that states do not have the possibility of forming binding agreements
through renegotiation, preventing this indefinite defection.49
Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which such renegotiation is possible,
and the offer to renegotiate and abide by the results is credible. If so, states will have
incentives to defect and an alternative, “renegotiation-proof,” strategy is needed. We
offer the penance strategy described below as a “weakly renegotiation-proof” alternative.
iii. Penance
If renegotiation is possible and credible, the states will prefer to renegotiate after a
defection, making defection an attractive option. 50 The strategy known as “penance”51,
is both individually credible in that states would individually find it attractive to play it,
and collectively credible in the sense that it is likely to be more attractive than
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renegotiation.52 Fudenberg and Tirole show that the following “penance” strategy profile
is “weakly renegotiation proof”: “Begin in the cooperative phase where both states play
Cooperate. If a single state A switches to Defect, switch to the punishment phase for A.
In this phase, state A plays Cooperate and the other state plays Defect. Play remains in
this phase until the first time state A plays Cooperate, at which point play returns to the
cooperative phase.”53
The logic of this strategy in the CIL context is that a state having defected from a
rule can have the rule reinstated only by accepting a period of punishment, in which it
cooperates while the other state defects against it. The period of punishment is equal to
the period of defection, ensuring that there is no net gain from defection.
A form of penance seems to be endorsed by the International Law Commission of
the United Nations as the CIL rule for application in international law generally. Articles
49 to 54 of the Articles on State Responsibility provide that countermeasures may be
used only to induce a state to cease a wrongful act and to make reparations;54 they must
be commensurate with the injury.55
iv. Equilibrium Selection, Coordination and the Role of CIL
One of the problems in a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma is identifying the
strategy that other players are playing and coordinating on a single strategy. Fudenberg
and Tirole conclude: “Thus, repeated play with patient players not only makes
‘cooperation’—meaning efficient payoffs—possible, it also leads to a large set of other
equilibrium outcomes. Several methods have been proposed to reduce this multiplicity of
equilibria; however, none of them has yet been widely accepted, and the problem remains
a topic of research.”56 Under circumstances of multiple equilibria, “anything that tends to
focus the players’ attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly
recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus
actually implement.”57 While there is no formal solution to this problem in the game
theory literature, states may coordinate through diplomacy, through other
communication, or through their actions advancing particular customary rules. The
selection among multiple equilibria may be understood as a separate, coordination game.
Here, CIL (as reflected for example in the Rules of State Responsibility) and institutions
like the International Law Commission may also play a role.
3. Assumptions Within the Multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Having selected the multilateral repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, and the
penance or grim trigger strategy, in this section, we develop the more specific parameters
and assumptions of our model. We introduce the concepts behind these parameters,
explain their salience, and justify the assumptions made in our model.
Recall that the basic model is a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which repetition
of the game in the future, with future payoffs from cooperation, increases the incentives
to comply. Under these circumstances, much depends on the frequency of future
interaction, the patience of states to receive these future payoffs, and the ability of states
to identify defection by others.
a. Payoffs, Efficiency and Symmetry
By postulating the payoff structure of the prisoner’s dilemma, we implicitly
assume that failure to reach a cooperative equilibrium—failure to reach an implicit
agreement—is inefficient. That is, the payoffs from cooperation are greater than the
payoffs from mutual defection. Of course, there are many circumstances in which no
implicit agreement is needed, and reaching one would be inefficient. However, our goal
is to examine strategic barriers to implicit agreement; reducing these barriers would
generally increase efficiency, just as reducing the general barriers to contract between
private parties would generally increase efficiency without requiring that parties contract
in every circumstance. This perspective is consistent with the first theorem of welfare
economics, the Coase Theorem, and the “efficiency principle”: “If people are able to
bargain together effectively, and can effectively implement and enforce their decisions,
then the outcomes of economic activity will tend to be efficient (at least for the parties to
the bargain).”58 If the barriers to bargaining are eliminated, and parties reach no bargain,
we may assume that there was no Pareto improving bargain available.
As stated above, we assume payoffs along the lines of the classic prisoner’s
dilemma. Even within this category, however, there is variation. Some circumstances
will be more like a commons problem, or a cartel, in which the greater the number of
players that comply, the greater the incentives to defect. Others will be the opposite,
based on network effects, public goods or economies of scale: the more players that
comply, the greater the incentives to comply.59 In other cases, the payoffs from defection
may not be substantially greater than the payoffs to compliance.
Different players may be affected differently by defection or compliance.
Certainly in the CIL field there are notable cases of asymmetry. For example, a state
with an extensive diplomatic service will have more at stake in connection with a rule of
diplomatic immunity. A land-locked state may have a different perspective on the
territorial sea than a state with extensive coastlines. Asymmetry affects each state’s
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incentives to comply. Linkage among varying issues may either increase or decrease
asymmetry.60
b. Identity and Number of Players
We disagree with the skepticism of prior work regarding the possibility for
cooperative multilateral outcomes even in contexts that do not provide the possibility for
formally binding agreements. The industrial organization literature recognizes important
possibilities for cooperative outcomes in even large-numbers multilateral settings. The
same seems to apply to the CIL game.
The number of players in any particular instance of the CIL game will vary. The
maximum number of players is the total number of states in the world, although even this
may ignore some detail. There are other players besides states, including sub-state
governmental entities, international government entities, non-government organizations
and individuals, so we have a potentially unlimited universe. In this connection, as a
simplifying assumption, we assume “billiard ball” states. While we recognize that we
lose nuance by doing this, we are trying to work with a simple model that assumes that
states have unitary preferences. As we discuss the implications of our model, and ways
to increase the incentives for compliance, we suggest that the structure of domestic
government is worth considering in order to determine the degree of patience of states
and the degree to which state decision-makers are concerned with the possibility of
retaliation in areas outside their functional responsibility.
Even limiting our universe to states, with approximately 200 in the world, there
would seem to be a significant problem of obtaining information about positions and
practices, as well as coordination. However, while states may possess formal sovereign
equality, they are not substantively equal, and their participation in the CIL formation
process is not homogeneous.61
Oscar Schachter writes that “As a historical fact, the great body of CIL was made
by remarkably few States. Only the States with navies—perhaps 3 or 4—made most of
the law of the sea. Military power, exercised on land and sea, shaped the customary law
of war and, to a large degree, the customary rules on territorial rights and principles of
State responsibility.”62 While of course historical circumstances have changed, this
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suggests a game in which the number of players varies, depending on the degree of
implication of their interests, and depending on their ability to affect outcomes. In this
game, players are heterogeneous across a number of parameters, including interest and
power, and as will be seen below, degree of patience. In this sense, we may think of
powerful states engaging in the CIL formation and maintenance game as exerting power
through the articulation, formation and maintenance of CIL rules. Schachter wrote of
general CIL, but it is also possible to have regional or other plurilateral CIL.63
Some of the leading authors in this field are skeptical of the possibility for
multilateral customary processes to result in stable and efficient strategic equilibria under
circumstances other than pure self-interest or coercion. For example, Goldsmith and
Posner see little possibility for efficient resolution of prisoner’s dilemma games in
multilateral settings.64 While they see the possibility for efficient equilibria in certain
bilateral settings, they assume that "the bilateral prisoner's dilemma cannot in any event
be generalized to the situation of multilateral cooperation, which is such an important part
of the traditional account."65 In this connection, they follow an established tradition, led
by Mancur Olson in 1965:
[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common
or group interests.66
Olson based his perspective on the assumptions that the benefit of cooperation
declines with the number of players, that the costs of monitoring increase with the
number of players, and that the costs of organizing retaliation increase with the number
of players.67 However, it can readily be seen that these are conjectures about the world,68
and are not necessarily true of any particular circumstance. Moreover, these are only a
subset of the parameters worth considering. Finally, technological and social change has
made it easier in some circumstance to monitor and to organize retaliation.69 Our model
provides a broader context in which to consider these, and other, parameters.
Oye identifies three slightly different ways in which increasing the number of
players reduces the likelihood of cooperation: (i) increasing transaction costs, (ii) the
63
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lack of credibility of retaliation by third parties, suggesting that players would not
retaliate against a defector, and (iii) increased heterogeneity of relative patience among
larger numbers of players.70 The transaction cost problem (compared to transaction
benefits) with increasing numbers of players is merely a conjecture and could readily be
countervailed by the possibility of economies of scale and scope. As discussed above,
the credibility issue may vary depending on the strategy assumed. Furthermore, as
discussed below, it is entirely possible that merely bilateral retaliation could support an
efficient equilibrium. With respect to heterogeneous degrees of patience, as set forth in
more detail below, we would agree with Oye that the ability to achieve cooperation
would depend on the degree of patience of the least patient state. The implication of this
constraint is that patient states may find it useful to exclude impatient states from certain
cooperative arrangements. They may also be interested in increasing the patience of
impatient states.
c. Information and Bilateral versus Multilateral Retaliation
The relative scale of information in the international system is somewhat different
from that in a municipal setting. That is, the cost of producing and distributing
information regarding state behavior may be a much smaller fraction of the utility of
cooperation in the international setting than it may be in municipal inter-firm contexts.
Furthermore, there are significant asymmetries among states in terms of the relative cost
and value of producing information. Epistemic communities among government officials
may play an important role in information transmission.
There are significant differences between a bilateral game and a multilateral
game, and between a multilateral game with bilateral retaliation and one with multilateral
retaliation. Under bilateral retaliation, information problems are significantly reduced,
albeit not eliminated. Our model assumes bilateral retaliation, but multilateral retaliation
is possible under some information conditions and would sustain cooperation in a wider
range of circumstances.
An important aspect of the structure of the game pertains to the ability to retaliate
in a discriminatory manner. States may have trouble discriminating in the application of
sanctions for several reasons. First, they may not be able to obtain information regarding
the author of the violation. This might occur, for example, with respect to pollution at
sea, or terrorist attack. Second, it may be costly for states to respond in a discriminating
way. For example, if the sanction involves trade barriers, the sanctioning state must
instruct its customs officers to discriminate among goods by origin. Third, and most
important, the relevant good being produced by cooperation may be non-excludable.
This would occur with the provision of public goods or the protection of international
commons. To the extent that states are unable to discriminate, their retaliation, if any,
must be multilateral, instead of bilateral. This obviously limits the strategies that they are
able to play and the relationships that they may enter into. Thus, given that the strategies
available to a state are “cooperate” or “defect,” there are at least two possibilities that we
need to consider in connection with a multilateral game:
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(i)

(ii)

Bilateral Retaliation: Defection by state a against state b leads to
punishment of a only by state b: bilateral defection leads to bilateral
punishment; or
Multilateral Retaliation: Defection by state a against state b leads to
punishment of a by all states: bilateral defection leads to multilateral
punishment.

We focus our analysis on bilateral retaliation for three reasons. First, it makes the
analysis simpler without changing any of the qualitative conclusions. Second,
multilateral retaliation simply increases the incentives to comply over bilateral retaliation.
Since bilateral retaliation involves milder punishment of defection than multilateral
retaliation, the conditions that support cooperation with bilateral retaliation under
bilateral retaliation will certainly support cooperation with multilateral retaliation under
multilateral retaliation. In other words, where multilateral retaliation is possible, the
conditions that we identify below are sufficient but not necessary to support a multilateral
rule: any degree of patience that supports a multilateral CIL rule with bilateral retaliation
will also support such a rule with multilateral retaliation. Third, there is some force to the
argument that bilateral retaliation is a more plausible scenario than multilateral retaliation
in most of the situations in which the formulation of CIL is likely to be considered.
Articles 42, 48 and 54 of the International Law Commission’s Rules on State
Responsibility71 generally prevent retaliation by third states for truly bilateral injury,
while there seems no basis for retaliation by an injured state against non-injuring states.
These rules seem to limit the formal possibility for multilateral retaliation against truly
bilateral defection, at least within a particular CIL rule. On the other hand, where a CIL
rule is not formed, or falls into desuetude, we might understand that there is multilateral
retaliation, as well as retaliation against non-injuring states.
In any event, in our model, we assume that retaliation is applied bilaterally—that
if state a defects vis-à-vis state b, only state b will respond, and only against state a. If
multiple states responded against state a, it would simply make cooperation more likely
by increasing the punishment for defection.
Thus, assuming bilateral retaliation, we can represent a multilateral prisoner’s
dilemma game as a set of bilateral games. As will be seen below, this is not the same as
assuming a bilateral game. Rather, it is a multilateral game with bilateral retaliation.
Although we assume bilateral retaliation, it is worthwhile to discuss the
possibility and implications of multilateral retaliation. Under multilateral retaliation, we
would be concerned about the ability of players to find out about the compliance or
defection history or characteristics of other players. On the one hand, it may be costly for
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an individual to find out for himself the history of many other players. On the other
hand, the potential responses of many other players, if engaged, may add to the
disincentives for defection. There are economies of scale and scope in this type of
system, which may countervail increased information costs that exist in an n-player
setting.72
Along these lines, Kandori explains that informal enforcement mechanisms fall
into two categories: those that use personal enforcement and those that use community
enforcement. These correspond to what we have been referring to as bilateral retaliation
and multilateral retaliation. Kandori examines circumstances in which social norms work
to support efficient outcomes in infrequent transactions—absent repetition that can allow
personal enforcement, but under circumstances where community enforcement may
occur.73 Thus, but there may be circumstances in which multilateral retaliation could
substitute for repetition. Alternatively, as noted above, multilateral retaliation could
result in cooperation in circumstances in which bilateral retaliation would be insufficient.
Where members of a community can observe each other’s behavior, community
enforcement works in much the same way as personal enforcement.74 Kandori assumes
this is the case in small communities. We might suggest that the global community can
be understood as a small community in this sense. CIL rules often address matters that
are public knowledge and are reported in the press. Imagine a municipal community
where each individual’s behavior is subject to journalistic and intelligence investigation.
Kandori assumes private information that is not shared among community
members. When observability is not perfect, private information regarding compliance
with a norm, as well as the distribution of the private information, will be more
complicated, and costly. Cooperation may be difficult to sustain because the community
may not have defined adequately the social norm or the determination and labeling of
defectors. Kandori shows, in theoretical terms, that even where an agent does not have
any direct information of other agents’ behavior vis-à-vis other members of the
community, cooperative behavior can sometimes be sustained. In the CIL game, with
seemingly greater relative ability to observe treatment of third parties compared to private
society, we would expect a greater basis for cooperation.
Of course, multilateral sanctions are dependent on information regarding defection, and a
judgment that the subject has violated the relevant norm. Information may be a trivial
problem in certain areas of CIL, but a difficult problem in others. Various institutional
responses are possible to provide greater certainty in judging violations. Judgments can
depend on individual state determinations, or on community views, or consensus, which
may be led by a “reputation entrepreneur” or other opinion leader. On the other hand, it
can be achieved through an independent institution such as a court. And it must be
recalled that in this type of setting, even a court’s views can be criticized and challenged.
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As Milgrom, North and Weingast argue with respect to the non-state institutions
that enforced compliance among early medieval merchants, “It is the costliness of
generating and communicating information—rather than the infrequency of trade in any
particular bilateral relationship—that, we argue, is the problem that the system of private
enforcement was designed to overcome.”75
Unlike in the municipal setting, the international setting provides no system of
courts with broad mandatory jurisdiction. Milgrom, North and Weingast argue that thirdparty dispute settlement can assist in developing cooperation. Third-party dispute
settlement can solve the following information problem. If two parties have a dispute, in
which one accuses the other of defection, how can other members of the community
determine whether the accusation is true?76 Third-party dispute settlement, along the
lines of the “law merchant,” may be more valuable to resolve information problems in the
municipal context among traders than in the international context among states. First,
there may be fewer states than there are potential traders in the medieval traders’ setting.
Second, again, the cost of information about state compliance may be a smaller
proportion of the value of CIL “transactions.” Milgrom, North and Weingast conclude
within the municipal context that, given the lack of empirical evidence about the costs of
running different kinds of institutions, it is not possible to develop a formal model to
show that their third-party dispute settlement minimizes information costs. However,
they opine that the system seems to incur only the kind of costs that are inevitable and
seems well-designed to minimize those costs.77
The Milgrom, North and Weingast “law merchant” is a private purveyor of
information and evaluation. The players accept its use in order to develop an efficient
equilibrium. We might consider the extent to which formal international institutions such
as the International Court of Justice, the WTO’s dispute settlement process or its Trade
Policy Review Mechanism fill a similar role in connection with states, and whether
NGOs playing an informal role, such as Amnesty International or the World Wildlife
Fund, or informal institutions such as the Basle Committee (bank regulation) or the
Waasenar Arrangement (export controls on dual use commodities), can do so in
particular niches.
We assume perfect information in our model. This assumption seems reasonable
given our assumption of bilateral retaliation. However, in order for multilateral
retaliation to operate, information problems must be overcome.
d. Patience/Discount Factors, Horizon and the Shadow of the Future
When international lawyers discuss incentives for compliance, they often refer to
the possibility of role-reversal in the future: of reciprocity and retaliation. However,
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from a rationalist standpoint, a critical question is how powerful is the shadow of the
future? In repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, theorists have shown that the degree to which
players value future payoffs will have an effect on players’ incentives to comply with a
norm. All things being equal, the extent to which the player values future payoffs will
determine the extent to which these future payoffs affect the player’s behavior.78
We represent the extent of valuation of future payoffs as a discount factor79 —a
factor used to reflect the present value to a particular player of future payoffs. The
discount factor reflects the preference of the player for payoffs now versus payoffs in the
future. We may understand the discount factor as a central variable, which interacts
with other variables such as the per-period magnitude of future payoffs, the relative
payoffs of defection versus cooperation, the horizon or number of periods predicted,
frequency of repetition, the number of other players under multilateral retaliation, and the
degree of linkage to other relationships.
While it might be argued that the CIL game will continue infinitely, in order to
emphasize the role of patience in our model, it is useful to assume that the game will be
finite, but that at any given time it is unknown when it will end. Thus, we assume a low
probability that the game will be short. At any given moment, there will be a long, but
finite, horizon.
Public choice considerations would counsel that horizons vary. After all, if the
real interaction is not between states but between governments, we must recognize that
governments have varying effective horizons. Governments come and go. The
relationship between state and government horizons is to some extent determined by the
degree of accountability of the government—the degree to which it represents the
interests of the state. However, a democracy may have a shorter horizon than a
dictatorship. Some states may have more frequent or more imminent elections at
particular moments. Separately from the frequency or imminence of elections, we would
want to model the relative stability of the ruling party or coalition. Much depends on the
prospects for reelection, the stability of the dictatorship, and the stability of the
dictatorship’s policies, including their susceptibility to variation due to corruption.
Furthermore, it may be useful to examine whether the real actor is neither the state nor
the government, but a more entrenched bureaucracy. Transnational networks may have
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greater durability than international networks. We combine this question of an individual
state’s or government’s time horizon with “patience.”
Included in the set of assumptions underlying the prisoner’s dilemma is the
assumption of the isolation of the game under analysis. However, casual observation of
international society suggests that there are many linkages,80 with the result that few
issues can be isolated.81 Players can bind one another in a variety of ways, including by
linking the present game to other games in a “supergame.”
It is generally understood that a mutually beneficial outcome can exist as a
credible equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma where the game is repeated, subject to
conditions relating to the players’ discount rates and the time horizon.82 The reason is
simple to see. With repeated play current actions can be conditioned on past actions,
introducing the possibility of rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. Repetition
of itself is not, however, sufficient to secure continued cooperation. If the game is
repeated a known finite number of times, both players will have an incentive to defect in
the final period, and the game unravels from there to immediate defection.83 By contrast,
if the game is repeated indefinitely, then “all players defect every period” will remain a
credible equilibrium, but there may be additional credible equilibria, depending on the
parties’ discount factors.84
“The ‘folk theorems’ for repeated games assert that if the players are sufficiently
patient, then any feasible, individually rational payoffs can be enforced by an
equilibrium. Thus, in the limit of extreme patience, repeated play allows virtually any
payoff to be an equilibrium outcome.”85 Under circumstances of high discount factors,
when players are “patient,” the short-term gain from defection in one play is outweighed
by the aggregation of even small losses in all future periods. Fudenberg and Maskin
show that frequent transactions with the same partner, regardless of the number of
players, the number of strategies available, or the size of the payoffs, make it possible to
reach an equilibrium with efficient trading.86
e. Multi-Sector Contact
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Firms, and states, operate in multiple markets and encounter other firms, or states,
in multiple contexts: as competitor here, as supplier there, as co-conspirator elsewhere.
Industrial organization economists studying the effect of multi-market contact have found
that this cross-sectoral activity may support cooperation.87 “With multimarket contact
collusion can be viable in a set of markets even when in the absence of multimarket
contact it could not be supported in any of these markets.”88
“Multimarket contact allows firms to use the threat of a simultaneous punishment
in more markets, which is stronger than the sum of the independent punishments because
a firm being punished in one market has a higher marginal valuation of profits, therefore
it values more the losses from punishments in other markets.”89
One important difference between the commercial context and the international
relations context is that state relations in the international context almost always cross a
number of sectors.90 States relate to one another in a variety of contexts, with varying
roles in each context. Thus, in one context, State A may be concerned about the scope of
its prescriptive jurisdiction, while in another context it may be concerned about the scope
of its responsibilities to protect foreign diplomats. As a result, while there may be a
“prescriptive jurisdiction game” that is separate from the “diplomatic immunity game,”
these games may be linked. In fact, states regularly link issues in international
relations,91 with the result that it is not possible to establish precise boundaries for any
particular game.
Defection in one area may have consequences in another, with the possibility of
cross-sectoral punishment. Thus, it is not enough to examine whether states have
sufficient incentives for compliance within a particular sector or arrangement; one must
also analyze the effect of activity in other sectors.
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Matsushima argues that multimarket contact can take the place of perfect
information as a basis for a stable equilibrium of implicit collusion. Matsushima shows
that with multimarket contact, cooperation can take place even under circumstances of
relatively low discount factors.92
This conclusion suggests that international cooperation in different sectors may be
mutually supportive, and that there may be a kind of network effect that makes each
additional instance of cooperation more attractive than it would be absent existing
instances.93 This game theoretic perspective provides support for the early neofunctionalist hypotheses regarding international economic integration.94
However, the possibility that the “real” decision-maker is a subnational actor,95
such as a bureaucracy with a limited sectoral mandate, may affect the possibility of
effective multi-sector contact. This may be a reason why assignment of broad
international relations authority to centralized ministries of foreign affairs may be useful.
While as argued by Downs and Jones,96 a particular state may have multiple reputations,
within multiple contexts, segmentation need not be complete, so that it may be that
defection in one context may have consequences within another context. Without further
empirical study, it is not possible to know how much segmentation exists in states’
reputations. Such study would examine the extent to which different ministries within
states, and different “epistemic communities” on a transnational basis, communicate
across sectors. It is important to note, however, that particular segments, such as trade,
environment or arms control, have within them multiple relationships. Finally, it may be
that segmentation of reputation is efficient from the standpoint of domestic
accountability, allowing different parts of a national government to take responsibility for
their own relations, and to develop the kind of reputation that maximizes returns within
the relevant segment.
Furthermore, Downs’ and Jones’ argument is explicitly about treaty, not custom.
In a treaty setting, despite the broad scope of remedies available under the Rules of State
Responsibility, states might be understood as implicitly accepting only intra-treaty
remedies for breach. However, in the custom context, there is no explicit or implicit
limitation on responsive or remedial action. Therefore, it may well be that in this more
delicate and nuanced context, where there is no implicit consent to limitation, states
would consider themselves less constrained in their responsive or remedial action. In
addition, much responsive action in this informal setting is likely to take the form of
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abstention from future transactions, rather than some form of punishment within the
context of the present transaction.
Milgrom, North and Weingast, examining the behavior of medieval merchants,
explain that “if the relationship itself is a valuable asset that a party could lose by
dishonest behavior, then the relationship serves as a bond. . . .”97 Thus the shadow of the
future effect is intensified by multi-market contact and perfect information. The broader
this effect, the greater the likelihood that individual states will respect individual rules.
4. Plausible Examples of the CIL Game
Before we go on to articulate the model and its implications, it is worthwhile to
stop and suggest how certain actual CIL rules might fit into this framework.
Our purpose in this article is merely to elaborate a theory that shows the
plausibility of efficient equilibria in a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma model of CIL. We
did not set out to prove that such efficient equilibria exist in nature, or to prove any of the
hypotheses that flow from our model. However, it is useful, by way of illustration rather
than proof, to set out some examples of circumstances that can plausibly be characterized
as international multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas that seem to have reached cooperative
equilibria, as opposed to circumstances of intrinsic self-interest, narrow coercion, a
bilateral prisoner’s dilemma, or a bilateral coordination game. We hasten to note that our
characterization of these examples, like those advanced by others, is dependent upon
subjective judgment as to the payoff structure that these circumstances may entail.
However, without empirical proxies for payoffs, it is not possible to do better.
Much of international law relates to the allocation of authority, or responsibility
for harm. These types of rules may be analogized to rules of property and tort.98 So, for
example, iconic CIL rules such as diplomatic immunity, sovereign immunity, territorial
sovereignty, and the territorial sea, may be understood in terms of allocation of authority,
which may be assimilated to property. Rules such as responsibility for harm to aliens, or
responsibility for environmental harms to other states, may be assimilated to tort.
The strategic context for formation of property or tort rules depends on a number
of parameters. These parameters include the costs and benefits of the resource or the
potential harm, the degree of natural excludability and the cost of artificial exclusion, the
degree of rivalry of consumption, the degree of bilateral monopoly, and the transaction
costs of negotiation. We outline below four examples that seem to follow the prisoner’s
dilemma structure.
a. Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
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Under the traditional “absolute” theory of sovereign immunity, which was applied
by the U.S. until the 1952 “Tate Letter,” states may engage in “sovereign” acts or in
“commercial” acts, and still enjoy jurisdictional immunity from foreign courts. With the
rise of state trading and international commerce, this resulted in greater frequency of
disappointed private persons who had dealt with foreign states only to find that they had
no legal recourse.
This state of affairs may be characterized as a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma as
follows. Each state individually would be better off, in terms of its potential
responsibility to private persons, maintaining the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.
However, if all states take this position, then commercial enterprises may be harmed in a
greater amount, trade may be diminished, and global welfare may be reduced.99 There
may be a degree of asymmetry due to differences in utilization of state trading. The
Soviet Union and its satellites favored absolute immunity.
During the 20th century, states like the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and most
trading states, adopted the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity, which holds that
states lack immunity for acts of a commercial nature. When states adopted the restrictive
theory, they accepted the possibility of lawsuits against them based on the restrictive
theory. If a state were to decline to adopt the restrictive theory, or renege on adoption of
the restrictive theory, and claim absolute immunity, they would be required to grant
immunity to foreign states, reverting to the less efficient status quo (grim trigger). States
therefore had sufficient incentives to “cooperate” in enhancing global welfare by
adhering to and continuing to adhere to the restrictive theory.
When the first state shifted from the absolute to the restrictive theory, it was
possible that other states could have claimed a violation of the traditional rule of CIL:
absolute immunity. Instead, they gradually accepted the restrictive theory. Our model
suggests that they may have done so in light of the possible future gains from acceptance
of the restrictive theory. This case is not easy to characterize as a series of bilateral
games, but is better characterized as a multilateral game, with the possibility of bilateral
retaliation while adhering to the restrictive theory, or multilateral retaliation by rejecting
the restrictive theory completely. It is a multilateral game because the uniformity
acceptance of the restrictive theory would create both public goods effects in terms of
increased world trade and network externality effects in terms of reducing the costs of
contracting by reducing the need to check which states have adopted the restrictive
theory.
b. Cross-Border Environmental Harm
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The rule of sic utere tuo, adopted in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,100 is derived
from, and remains akin to, the early law of nuisance.101 In allocating responsibility to the
source state with respect to transboundary pollution, it requires the internalization of
externalities. We may understand this rule, like the coordinate domestic law of nuisance,
to respond to a collective action problem. Each individual state has incentives to
externalize pollution if it fails to take into account harm to downwind or downstream
states. The Coase theorem, criticizing Pigou, teaches that every externality need not be
internalized. However, there will be transaction cost contexts in which internalization is
useful.
The case of transboundary pollution may be understood using the prisoner’s
dilemma, assuming that global welfare may be increased if each state internalizes
externalities in making decisions about their pollution. Each state individually has
incentives to violate this rule. The CIL rule of sic utere tuo arose in order to establish a
rule of internalization. It is enforced by the threat of grim trigger, in the form of a
“pollute thy neighbor” rule, or by the implicit threat of smaller retaliation along the lines
of penance. The sic utere tuo rule applies where pollution crosses a single border, as well
as where it crosses multiple borders. Furthermore, the transboundary pollution problem,
like the nuisance problem, is one where there may be economies of scale in uniformity of
arrangements. Therefore, this is not simply a bilateral game.
The emergence of the sic utere tuo rule in international law could plausibly follow
a similar path to the emergence of the coordinate rule, or other property rights, in
domestic law.102
To the extent that a specific type of environmental protection is inexhaustible
(whether or not it satisfies the other criterion to be a public good and is non-excludible),
such as the ozone layer, it may be that the benefits of participation rise with the number
of states that participate. Not all environmental goods will have the same payoff
structure, and so the sic utere tuo rule would require extensive analysis.
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c. Territorial Sovereignty and Non-Acquisition of Territory by Use of Force
The general and specific rules associated with territorial sovereignty may also be
modeled, like property rights, as a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma. In particular, during
the last century, the customary international law rule against formal acquisition of
territory by force seems to have met with stronger compliance.103 We may understand
this principle as a disincentive for the use of force. If states are restrained by a principle
of non-acquisition, they will have weaker incentives to use force. How can we
understand the emergence of this principle?
Each state individually has incentives to retain flexibility to acquire territory
through the use of force. However, each state also wishes, defensively, to remove the
flexibility of other states to acquire its territory, or perhaps that of others, through the use
of force. Each state has incentives to defect, but refrains from doing so due to fear of
retaliation in other areas, or in the narrower area of acquisition of territory. Again, we
can see that either grim trigger or penance may serve to maintain the equilibrium of nonacquisition by force.
This problem does not seem to have the characteristics of a commons or a cartel.
That is, it does not appear that the incentives to violate increase with the number of states
that comply. If many states had designs on the same territory, as in colonial times, this
might be the case, and perhaps is the reason that a rule against acquisition by force only
arose more recently. Today it appears that where a state covets other territory, it is only a
neighbor’s adjacent territory. This rule may have security benefits that rise with the
number of states that adhere. That is, the greater the number of states that adhere, the
lower the incentives preemptively to attack and therefore the lower each state’s defense
budget must be. Thus, it is plausible that this rule would result in increasing incentives to
comply with rising numbers of adherents.
d. Territorial Jurisdiction
Customary international law includes the norm of territorial jurisdiction. Each
state generally has jurisdiction over conduct within its territory. There is some dispute
regarding the scope for “extraterritorial” jurisdiction, usually referring to conduct abroad
that has adverse effects within the territory of the state seeking to assert jurisdiction.
According to sections 402-403 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law, and according to a number of states and scholars, there are
substantial limits on the right of a state to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. According to
the Restatement, states may not exercise jurisdiction where it would be “unreasonable” to
do so in light of the various connections and interests involved. For our purposes, the
only important fact is that there is some arguable limit. We can understand this limit
within the prisoner’s dilemma model. It is noteworthy that, while the U.S. has on
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occasion asserted the right to apply its law “extraterritorially,” it has often been at
significant diplomatic cost, and has often been subject to diplomatic adjustment.
We may assume that each state would prefer to exercise jurisdiction without limit,
in order to affect circumstances that may impose negative externalities on its citizens.
This is in some sense the reverse Coasian position of the sic utere tuo story. Each state is
restrained by the fear of reciprocation or retaliation, resulting in a stable and efficient
equilibrium.
It might be argued that the territorial jurisdiction problem raises commons issues.
The more states that adhere to a rule of territoriality, the greater the benefits, in terms of
regulatory geographic scope, to a violating state. On the other hand, compliance with a
rule of territoriality would generally be aligned with rejection of foreign
“extraterritoriality.” So, it may be that the benefits of violation do not rise with the
number of states that comply. It is notable that there is little consensus on the existence
or content of a rule of customary international law in this field.
5. The CIL Game
Our discussion in parts 2 and 3 indicates that there are many possible assumptions
that we might make in developing a CIL game. As noted above, we choose to focus on
one such game – the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game – for two principal reasons.
First, this is a setting in which all of the relevant states prefer formation of and
compliance with a CIL rule to the other possible outcomes. Second, it is a setting in
which each state can gain from deviating from the cooperative outcome and in which
there are no centralized means to enforce any agreement not to deviate.
The games we develop allow us to identify plausible circumstances under which
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma can result in efficient equilibria both bilaterally and
multilaterally. Moreover, they show what types of contexts, including malleable
institutional features, may affect the ability of states to reach such equilibria.
In Appendix I, we set forth in formal mathematical terms the structure of our
model. In this section, we describe the model in textual terms. The formal mathematical
depiction of the model allows us to show the relationship among the various parameters
of the model in a way that, if the data it calls for were inserted, would tell us something
about the possibilities for cooperation.
Under the prisoner’s dilemma’s payoff assumptions, each state prefers unilateral
defection to bilateral cooperation and prefers bilateral cooperation to bilateral defection.
The multilateral context of this game is captured by the assumption that some or all of the
payoffs in each of the component bilateral games are functions of the number of states in
the multilateral context, and the number of states cooperating. Given the assumptions of
the prisoner’s dilemma, we have the standard result that all states defect. In other words,
no CIL rule will be formed.

Assume instead that the game is repeated indefinitely. To make this more
concrete, assume that in any period each state believes that this game will be played again
with some probability less than certainty. Further suppose that each state has a particular
level of patience represented by a discount factor. Now consider whether cooperation
can be sustained as an equilibrium when the game is repeated indefinitely. For this to be
the case, cooperation must be a “subgame perfect equilibrium,” meaning in this case that
cooperation induces a set of strategies such that each state’s strategy is an optimal
response to the other states’ strategies at every repetition of play. One such strategy
profile that has the potential to support such an equilibrium is the grim trigger strategy:
1.
2.

Cooperate if both states have cooperated in all prior periods;
Defect in this and all subsequent periods if either state has defected in any
prior period.

As discussed above, an alternative strategy profile, addressing the problem of credibility
(collective rationality), is “penance:”
1.
2.
3.

Cooperate if both states have cooperated in all prior periods;
If one state defects in one period, the other state defects in all subsequent
periods until the initially defecting state cooperates.
After the initially defecting state cooperates for one period while the other
state defects, the latter state returns to cooperation.

Under either of these strategies, if both states are sufficiently patient—sufficiently
value future payoffs—both states will cooperate in all periods. The question of the
sufficiency of their patience is termed the “Patience Condition.” Stated differently, if
both states’ actual discount factors exceed a calculated “critical discount factor,”
cooperation will ensue.104
The Patience Condition can be interpreted in other ways that are directly relevant
to our analysis. First, CIL is more likely to emerge and be sustainable when the returns to
cooperation are high relative to non-cooperation and when the returns to unilateral
defection are low. Second, CIL is more likely to be formed between relatively patient
states: those with relatively high discount factors. Third, CIL is more likely where the
probability of continued interaction between the participating states is high.
The important question to which we now turn is that raised by Goldsmith and
Posner. Does increasing the number of participants make it tougher to sustain
cooperation? For this to be the case it is necessary that the critical discount factor
becomes higher—more difficult to meet—as the number of states involved increases.
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The simplest, but probably least likely, case is that in which none of the pay-offs
are affected by the number of states involved. If this is the case, then the multilateral CIL
rule is no more than the aggregation of a series of independent bilateral CIL rules and so
is no more difficult to sustain than the individual bilateral rules.
It is more likely, however, that the multilateral context has some relevance in that
the number of states that are effectively party to the multilateral CIL rule affects some of
the payoffs.105 This force could derive from the public goods or network aspect of the
establishment of the CIL rule itself, a point to which we turn below, or more generally
from the possibility that the greater the number of states that form a CIL rule, the greater
will be the aggregate benefits that flow from that rule.
However, the situation that is most often considered has the following
characteristics. First, the return to each state from cooperation decreases as the number
of states in the CIL rule increases. Second, the return to a state from defection is greater
when there are more states that continue to abide by the CIL rule. Third, non-formulation
of a CIL rule leaves states in an autarkic situation, so that the returns to non-formulation
or total breakdown of a proposed CIL rule are the same and independent of the number of
states. Where this is the case, it follows that the critical discount factor is increasing with
the number of states involved so that multilateral CIL is, indeed, harder to sustain than
bilateral CIL.
This is, however, not the same as saying that such CIL rules are impossible to
sustain or even highly unlikely to be sustained. First, we are more likely to see
multilateral CIL among states that have, and are expected to have, interactions over an
extended period. Second, multilateral CIL rules are more likely between “patient” states,
meaning states that tend to value future payoffs more highly than others. Third,
multilateral CIL rules are more likely to hold when the relevant interactions are frequent.
Moreover, there are three additional countervailing forces that can work to sustain
multilateral CIL.
The first follows from our analysis above. It is not difficult to imagine
circumstances in which the gains to unilateral defection fall with the number of states
while the share to each state from cooperation increases with the number of states.
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Where this is the case the conventional argument is actually reversed. Multilateral CIL
rules are easier to sustain than bilateral rules.
Under what circumstances might this arise? One possibility106 is that the rule
relates to the investment by each participating state in the provision of a public good.107
As more states participate, the investment in provision increases as does the benefit to the
individual state from cooperation. By contrast, the gains from defection can be expected
to decrease with the number of states. The same is likely to be true for policies with
strong network effects – for example, common international technology standards.108 A
single state may gain from going it alone but the potential gains are likely to be less the
more isolated the state is, that is, the more that the state looks like a single stand-out
where others adopt a common standard. A third possibility is that there are reputation
effects. A state gains from defecting on a rule but the act of defection harms the state’s
reputation, making it less likely that the state will be able to make agreements with other
states.
The second countervailing effect arises when states are involved in a series of
international rules (including treaty rules) with overlapping groups of partners. In such a
case, defection on one rule has potentially harmful effects for all of the rules to which a
particular state is party. This is similar to the analysis of the potential for multimarket
contact to maintain tacit agreements between firms.109
In any multilateral context in which states enter into bilateral as well as
multilateral rules, the critical discount factor decreases as the number of bilateral rules
that each state enters into increases. This leads to a simple but compelling proposition. A
state can use slack enforcement power in bilateral rules to sustain multilateral rules.
The third possibility is related to the second. Multilateral rules are more easily
sustained when they involve frequent interactions between the member states.
These latter two possibilities can, of course, interact. States may be able to enter
into multiple rules, some with frequent interaction and some with infrequent interaction.
By the same argument as above, a state can use slack enforcement power from rules with
frequent transactions to sustain rules with infrequent transactions.
Thus, there exists a significant set of cases in which it will be possible to form
multilateral customary rules of international law. The likelihood of formation in any
particular circumstance will depend on a number of factors, including (i) the relative
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value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii)
the extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of
cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has
characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network, (iv) the information
available to the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative
patience of states to realize benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term
defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and
(viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships
between the involved states.
6. Implications
The model presented above and in Appendix I suggests that CIL may affect
behavior, and that it will do so to varying extents under varying circumstances. This
model has implications for international legal theory, for CIL doctrine, for policy and for
research.
a. International Legal Theory Implication: CIL May Affect Behavior
The discussion in parts 2 and 3 and the model described in part 5 and in Appendix
I suggest that there exists a significant set of cases in which CIL will affect behavior. As
we cannot here assess in any particular case the actual value to states of cooperation, or
their discount rates, or many of the other factors included in the model, it is impossible to
say with certainty by how much, or how often, CIL affects behavior. But it is equally
impossible to say that it does not affect behavior, that it seldom does so, or even that it
only has marginal effects. So, we believe that CIL is plausible.
CIL seems no less plausible than social norms in the domestic context. In fact,
there are reasons to believe that it may be more plausible, based on economies of scale
and scope in information and multi-sector contact. On the other hand, there are
countervailing factors, including the possibility that individuals in small communities
have a greater sense of permanence than governments in international society, perhaps
making them more patient. Interestingly, this analysis suggests that states generally have
an interest in the development of domestic political institutions that will instill “patience”
in other states.
b. Normative Implications: Institutional Modifications
The prior analysis suggests a number of potential implications for policy.
“Perhaps game theory’s greatest potential for contributing to international law is to
provide a rigorous means of describing and articulating important aspects of state
interaction and cooperation. The hope is that fully developed game theoretic models will
help states design law that creates or enhances the conditions for cooperation, if such
cooperation is desirable.”110
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i. The Role of Regional or Plurilateral Custom
As demonstrated above, the number of states involved in forming a particular
customary rule may have a significant effect on the ability to form a rule. As we have
suggested, this effect will differ in direction, depending on the context. Therefore, states
may find that they can develop regional or other plurilateral rules of CIL in circumstances
where multilateral rules are more difficult to establish. Regional or other plurilateral
intensification of relationships, such as in the European Community or the OECD, may
establish the conditions for greater use of custom.
ii. Network Effects in Institutionalism
International cooperation in different sectors may be mutually supportive, and
there may be a kind of network effect that makes each additional instance of cooperation
more attractive than it would be absent existing instances. This game theoretic
perspective provides support for the early neo-functionalist hypotheses regarding
international economic integration, and suggests the potential value of cooperation “for
its own sake” or in order to facilitate further cooperation. It also provides theoretical
support for strategies of “constructive engagement” outside the CIL context. Network
effects may be enhanced in regional or other plurilateral111 contexts, by concentrating and
intensifying relationships.
iii. The Information Role of NGOs and International Courts
By disseminating information regarding compliance with particular norms, NGOs
or international organizations may play a critical role in improving information,
facilitating the development of CIL. In cases of complex rules or facts, where under a
regime of autointerpretation states may argue over compliance, courts or other
“independent” third parties may resolve this information problem more definitively.
iv. Custom and Treaty
This article applies the literature of law and social norms in a way that suggests a
bridge over the gulf between law and social norms. It recognizes that law on the one
hand, and social norms on the other hand, are alternative or sometimes complementary
means of social control, or social cooperation. It thus suggests the utility of comparative
institutional analysis112 between law, on the one hand, and social norms, on the other.
Custom is a mechanism for international “legislation” that requires only a degree
of consensus,113 not unanimity. Given the difficulty of establishing global treaties
without significant holdouts, and given the need to avoid free riders, we might understand
the CIL process as an alternative mechanism for global legislation. A rule of consensus
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acts as a default rule that promotes compliance, and increases the bureaucratic costs of
“persistent objectors.” We recognize that this type of strategy would raise concerns
regarding democratic legitimacy. However, this type of legislative technique is not more
invasive than majority voting, and the “persistent objector” rule allows states to opt-out
of rules that raise sufficient concern.
There is less of a distinction between CIL and treaty, on the one hand, than there
is between social norms and either contract or law, on the other hand. As treaty is in
legal theory only supported by CIL and by institutions created by treaty, rather than by an
external state, it is something less than contractual. In fact, we may understand treaty in
the international law context as an extension of custom, or of social norms. It is an
important extension, with the capacity to specify required performance in greater detail,
establishing greater agreement on the content of the relevant norm, and thereby
overcoming important information problems. Of course, to the extent the treaty specifies
binding dispute settlement, additional information problems may be overcome.
Furthermore, treaty has a greater capacity for concreteness than custom, and
treaty lends itself more to specificity—to rules as opposed to broad standards. Treaty
also is more amenable to domestic ratification, which is both a burden in terms of
efficiency of agreement, and a benefit in terms of accountability. As in the rules and
standards context,114 custom may serve as a pathfinder for later-established specific treaty
rules. Conversely, treaty structures, including dispute settlement, may serve as an
institutional setting to promote custom.
Further analysis of the relationship between treaty and custom, and the choice of
instruments in particular contexts, is beyond the scope of this article.
c. Doctrinal Implications: A Contractual Approach to Opinio Juris
We have not yet directly addressed the argument by Goldsmith and Posner that
CIL generally does no work—that state behavior is not motivated by CIL, but only by
self-interest.115 The implication of this argument, not made explicit by Goldsmith and
Posner, is that CIL does not exist, because CIL doctrine requires practice motivated by
opinio juris—by CIL. This argument is subject to several responses.
i. CIL Rules May Affect Behavior
First, our discussion in parts 2, 3 and 5 shows that CIL may affect behavior. So
our refutation of the assumption that the multilateral prisoner’s dilemma is unlikely to be
resolved shows that it is plausible that state behavior is affected by CIL.
ii. A Contractual Approach to Opinio Juris
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Recall that under the Restatement Third formulation, CIL does not exist without
opinio juris, or the sense of legal obligation. However, as D'Amato suggests,116 it seems
on first analysis that this requirement is circular: the first state that complies "from a
sense of legal obligation" must do so erroneously. There may be a solution to this
paradox.
Analogizing CIL to social norms, we might postulate that instead of a "sense of
legal obligation," the Restatement Third formulation might more correctly refer to an
"intent to create or accept a rule of law."117 As suggested by the formulation contained in
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we may in addition
refer to a "sense of incipient legal obligation."118 CIL may arise in the international
system in just the way that social norms arise in the domestic setting, with the same
possible beneficial effects in terms of cooperation and coordination. The social norms
analogy suggests, with McDougal, Mendelson, Swaine, and Thirlway119 that we may
understand the initial act of “compliance” not necessarily as an error, but as an offer or an
act of leadership. The offer and acceptance must generally take the form of practice,
although our model does not require us to take a position on the amount of practice that
will be necessary to constitute either an offer or an acceptance.
Consider the development of social norms in the municipal setting. The first time
that in Shasta County, a cattle farmer returned a lost calf to its owner without charge,
despite a lack of legal obligation, there existed no relevant social norm. Yet that action,
perhaps recognized by its author to provide efficiencies that would eventually benefit him
if multilateralized, or perhaps motivated by something else but interpreted as a proposal
to initiate a rule, began a process that resulted in a “social norm.”
If we understand the "sense of legal obligation" referenced in the Restatement
Third not as a sense of a fully-formed legal rule, but as a perception or assertion that a
legal rule would be beneficial, the circularity problem is resolved. Thus, custom must be
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understood not as mere action, but as an initial or continuing proposal for collective
action over time, with acceptance evidenced by compliance. A state may test a proposed
rule of collective action informally, without the domestic or international costs that
otherwise might attend the proposal.120 “Run it up the flagpole and see if anyone
salutes.” Supporting this approach, a recent report of the International Law Association
explained that opinio jurisrequires practice "in circumstances which give rise to a
legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future."121 This understanding also offers
a plausible explanation of changing rules of CIL. In fact, there is no real difference
between initiation and change: initiation of a rule is a change from a laissez-faire rule.
Thus, there is a rationale for the opinio juris requirement in terms of general state
intent:122 mere regularity of action, or mere action based on motives that do not include
the formation of a legal rule, cannot form a rule of CIL. This is recognized in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which specifies "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."123 Goldsmith and Posner seem correct
that motivation by narrow coincidence of interest (the “required” behavior intrinsically
benefits the actor) or narrow coercion (of a more direct and unilateral type than the
retaliation included in our model) are inconsistent with opinio juris and so do not
contribute to CIL. But even here, states are likely to act with varying and multiple
motivations, and it is possible that a CIL rule could be formed despite the fact that some
states adhere largely due to narrow coincidence of interest or narrow coercion.
Moreover, it is incorrect to argue that where states act out of self-interest, no opinio juris
can exist.
iii. CIL Rules May be Coterminous with Self-Interest
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Furthermore, there is a terminological or doctrinal problem with Goldsmith and
Posner’s argument, making it seem tautological. Goldsmith and Posner argue that
“[s]tates do not comply with CIL because of a sense of moral or legal obligation; rather,
CIL emerges from the states' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international
stage.”124 Unless Goldsmith and Posner mean merely to refute the natural law position
that states comply with international law because of its normative appeal or legitimacy or
because it is the right thing to do, this argument is a non-sequitur, as legal obligation and
self-interest are not mutually exclusive categories. Law and economics has long utilized
price theory to understand behavior under legal rules, and there is no question that law
can affect behavior through self-interest. In the CIL setting, the motivating force is wider
or potentially longer-term self-interest that flows from making and achieving compliance
with a rule, or even with rules generally: narrow or diffuse reciprocity.125
Goldsmith and Posner’s main point here must then be understood simply as the
application of an assumption of the rationalist model (and one that is subject to at least
some contention): that agents only care about their own utility, and therefore would not
follow a rule of CIL for intrinsic reasons: for its own sake.126 However, compliance with
international law resulting from a sense of legal obligation is consistent with extrinsic
reasons: there may well be utility in upholding a particular rule, or in upholding the rule
of law in general.
iv. Evidentiary Requirements
Third, a marginalist approach would reject the evidence presented by Goldsmith
and Posner as a basis for their argument. Their case-based evidence merely suggests in a
limited range of contexts that there are plausible non-CIL reasons for observed
behavior.127 Goldsmith and Posner adduce no data that suggests the relative magnitude
of these reasons, or that suggests the absence of other reasons. So, they and we have no
way of knowing that CIL was not a contributing, or alternative sufficient, cause of
behavior.128 Survey or interview data might be useful to fill this gap.
Of course, to the extent that a particular instance of compliance is fully and
exclusively explained by true coincidence of interest or coercion, it cannot be argued that
CIL did any work.129 Our theory of CIL examines the effects of broader self-interest
based on reciprocity, and accepts the possibility of a different kind of coercion by
punishment for defection, as a normal part of the CIL process. While CIL is endogenous
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to states in the aggregate, once formed it is at least largely exogenous to the particular
state. As explained above, we also find it plausible that there are important
circumstances in which CIL would have significant effects on state behavior.
v. Violations or Proposals for Change?
Related to the problem of determining whether a custom has the requisite
motivation under CIL doctrine is the question of how to deal with anomalous conduct.
Does the anomaly constitute the initiation of a revised rule of CIL, or a simple
violation?130 It is important to recognize that no law, in any system, achieves perfect
compliance. Thus we must determine another way to evaluate compliance. The best way
is to evaluate the extent to which law affects behavior. Thus, the fact that wars occur
does not alone mean that the international legal prohibition on the use of force is without
effect, just as the fact that murders occur does not mean a domestic proscription of
murder is meaningless. Goldsmith and Posner argue that variations in levels of
compliance suggest that no multilateral rule exists, or affects state behavior.131 However,
we would expect systematic circumstantial variations in compliance with respect to all
laws. That is, in order to determine that CIL exists, or that we as social scientists should
pay attention to it, it need not in every case determine behavior, so long as it may do so in
some set of marginal cases. In game theoretic terms, even a small effect of international
law could affect the payoffs from compliance, potentially tipping the balance in favor of
compliance in a marginal case.
Furthermore, in order to maintain the dynamic, evolutionary character of CIL, it is
necessary that any theory of CIL allow for some violations of existing rules to be
understood as proposals for the establishment of new rules.132 This is indeed a subtle and
difficult distinction, but it is necessary in any decentralized system. Thus, we should not
demand that CIL command absolute compliance, or be inflexible. In fact, one might
argue, as some do about the common law, that one of its great virtues is its dynamism.
d. Research Implications: An Empirical Research Agenda
Theory alone tells us little about the world. The next step is to develop and test
hypotheses based on the theory of CIL elaborated here.
i. Assessing the Patience/Horizon of States
In empirical research, it would be useful to determine parameters or proxies by
which to assess the patience (including the horizon) of states and governments, and to
regress these parameters against measures of compliance. Is political stability associated
with patience, and do we see greater compliance with CIL by states with greater political
stability? Are democratic states, or states with better developed financial markets, more
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patient? Are autocratic states more patient because they are not concerned about election
cycles? Do we see greater amounts of violation of law before an election than after? Is
patience determined by a bell curve, in which strong autocracies and stable democracies
are patient, and those in between are not? Are corrupt governments “impatient”? What
about more-or-less independent bureaucracies that may be charged with action that
determines compliance with specific rules of CIL? Can these independent bureaucracies
exhibit greater patience than their elected governments? These conjectures are linked to
liberal states theory,133 as well as to theories of transnational governmental networks.134
In fact, the correct level of analysis for compliance with certain rules of CIL, in terms
both of patience and information transmission, may be the bureaucratic division, rather
than the state.
ii. Proxies for Payoffs
Once we have developed empirical methods of measuring patience, it would be
necessary to develop proxies for payoffs from violation and compliance, in order to know
determine whether compliance occurs as predicted by the model described here.
iii. Payoff Structure
Is CIL more likely to be formed under circumstances involving public goods or
networks, where the value of cooperation may rise with the number of players?
iv. Network Externalities in International Law: More Relationships
Make Each Relationship More Reliable
Do we see an acceleration of custom, or a tipping point at which sufficient
relationships are established to make compliance with CIL more likely? Is there a
synergy between treaty and CIL? This hypothesis might be tested by examining the
relationship between entry into treaties and compliance with CIL. Again, the possibility
of network externalities is inconsistent with a disaggregation of the state into independent
functional components.
v. Regional Custom
To what extent can we identify regional or other plurilateral CIL, and how does it
compare in terms of compliance to universal CIL?
vi. Information
Is there a relationship between the establishment of NGOs that enhance
information regarding compliance and defection, or the establishment of adjudicative
bodies, and compliance with CIL?
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7. Conclusions
This article shows the rational plausibility of CIL. It thus serves as a basic
defense of the international law system. Indeed, this article presents not just a theory of
CIL, but also a theory of international law more generally. The theory presented here is
based on methodological and normative individualism. It thus departs substantially from
the airy idealism of natural law theory. It serves as a positive social scientific theoretical
basis for international legal positivism and a nuanced rationalism, basing law on the
action of states or their agents in pursuit of their self-interest, broadly understood.135 It
shows that CIL, and with it treaty law, is something of a levitation feat. It therefore rests
not on a rock-solid natural law basis of divine principles, but on a fabric of rational acts,
woven through a multiplicity of relations over time.
The goal of this article was to develop a model that would generate interesting
hypotheses about compliance with CIL. In this regard, our model should be compared
with Goldsmith-Posner's approach, which would suggest that there are no interesting
hypotheses about CIL because it cannot affect behavior. More particularly, Goldsmith
and Posner provide no analysis of the circumstances under which the multilateral
prisoner's dilemma, or the bilateral prisoner's dilemma, might yield stable and efficient
equilibria. In that sense, our article is quite different, and presents the possibility for a
progressive research program in CIL.
Some may ask, is this article about law, or is it only about social order, labeled
“law.” In a sense, of course, this article does not need to distinguish CIL from other
forms of cooperation--and indeed the basic model is generic, although we make
assumptions to accord with the CIL system, such as the general doctrinal rule of bilateral
retaliation.
So, while it is true that our basic model is a model of cooperation, and it applies to
CIL, to treaty, and to other forms of international cooperation, there are some distinctive
and important aspects of the CIL supergame that do not apply to general cooperation.
First, CIL rules may serve as equilibrium-selection devices, providing a greater
possibility for a stable equilibrium. Second, designation as CIL serves to incorporate a
substantial set of default rules that fill in a large portion of the “incomplete contract”
regarding many aspects of the obligation, including the scope of remedies for violation.
Third, it may be that designation as CIL serves to link compliance with any particular
CIL rule to others in order to widen the possible scope of retaliation to fields that might
not be considered “legitimate” otherwise. In this last connection, we might say that
designation as CIL increases the returns to compliance by placing at stake the general
sense of international legality. That is, if state A can be a scofflaw in one sector, what
prevents state B from being a scofflaw in an area that injures state A? In this sense, there
is a possibility for implicit multilateral retaliation, even if formal CIL doctrine does not
permit multilateral retaliation.
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This article also serves as a refutation of the central claim of structural realists in
political science with respect to international law: that it is epiphenomenal. This article
shows that law may well be a social expression of rules that achieve real collective goals,
are backed by real sanctions, and have real behavioral effects. It is a strange realism that
would ignore this.
If social norms theory in the domestic sphere finds social norms attractive as a
mechanism for production and enforcement of rules, perhaps CIL holds promise as an
alternative to treaty. Perhaps the main distinguishing feature, and potential value, of CIL
is systemic. That is, although we have assumed sectoral divisions for modeling purposes,
international law may also be understood as a set of linked games, or one extensive game.
Once a particular rule is absorbed into the CIL system, or is established through treaty, it
may benefit from linkage to other rules of CIL, and of treaty.136 The special nature of
legal rules may derive simply from their reception into this linked system. It is order and
law.
Like all positive social science, this theory has normative implications. CIL has
advantages and disadvantages as a process for making rules. As states identify these
advantages and disadvantages in particular contexts, they may decide in some contexts to
facilitate the development of CIL through institutional modifications.
***
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Appendix I
The repeated prisoner’s dilemma game has two important features, in common
with all repeated games. First, the strategies played by each state at time t can be made
conditional on the history of play up to time t. Second, these strategies can include the
possibility of punishment if a state deviates from an implicit agreement to follow a
particular strategy.
Assume that state i is a representative state in an n-state group that has implicitly
agreed to cooperate on some aspect of its international relations—for example, fishing
rights, protection of diplomats, expropriation, or technology standards. Further suppose
that a subgroup m of the universe of states n, such that m < n – 1, other than state i, have
also promised cooperation. If state i sticks by it promise to cooperate it receives Ci(n: m).
If state i defects on its promise against some group g of the cooperating states it receives
Gi(n, g: m). We further assume that if statei defects it triggers punishment only by those
states adversely affected by the defection.137 If state i cooperates while group g defects
against i then state i receives Li(n, g: m). Finally, if i defects against group g and this
group moves to its punishment strategy against i, then i receives Di(n, g: m).138
This game is an n-state prisoner’s dilemma game when the following conditions
hold for each state i in the group and for all m < n – 1 and g < m:
(i)
Ci(n: m) > Di(n, g: m): Cooperation with group g is better for state i than
mutual defection no matter the number of other states that are cooperating or
the size of group g;
(ii)
Gi(n, g: m) > Ci(n: m): State i is better off defecting against group g than
cooperating with g no matter the number of other states that are cooperating or
the size of group g;
(iii) Li(n, g: m) < Di(n, g: m): If group g defects against i then i is better off
defecting than continuing to cooperate with g.
Given that conditions (i) – (iii) are satisfied, we have the standard result that
defection is the dominant strategy for every state, no matter the number of states that are
cooperating. The Nash equilibrium to this game if it is played only once, or a finite
number of times known in advance to all the participants, is that all states defect. In
other words, even if a CIL rule is articulated it will not be followed.
Assume instead that the game is repeated indefinitely. To make this more
concrete, assume that in any period t state i believes that this game will be played again in
period t + 1 with probability i < 1. Further suppose that state i has discount factor Ri,
where 0 < Ri < 1 is a measure of impatience: the smaller is Ri the less patient state i is –
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the more that state i favors current benefits over future benefits. We can then construct a
“probability adjusted” discount factor i = i.Ri for each state.
Given that we are interested in the conditions that will sustain full cooperation of
all n states, we confine our attention to the case in which m = n – 1. We denote the group
“all states other than i” by n-i. Now consider whether the strategy combination
{Cooperate by i, Cooperate byn -i} can be sustained as an equilibrium for each state i
when the game is repeated indefinitely. For this to be the case, {Cooperate by i,
Cooperate by n-i} must be a subgame perfect equilibrium. One strategy profile that has
the potential to support such an equilibrium is the grim trigger strategy for each state:
1.
2.

Cooperate in period t if all states have cooperated in all periods up to and
including t – 1;
Defect against a defecting state in period t and all subsequent periods if the
defecting state has defected in any period prior to t.

As discussed in Part 2, an alternative strategy, addressing the problem of
collective rationality, is “penance.” Fudenberg and Tirole show that the following
“penance” strategy profile for each state i is “weakly renegotiation proof” (WRP):
“Begin in the cooperative phase where all states play Cooperate. If a single state A
switches to Defect against i, then i switches to the punishment phase for A. In this phase,
state A plays Cooperate and state i plays Defect against A. Play remains in this phase
until the first time state A plays Cooperate with i, at which point play returns to the
cooperative phase.”139 The logic of this strategy is that a state having defected from a
rule can have the rule reinstated only by accepting a period of punishment, in which it
cooperates while the states against which it has defected defect against it.
Whether we use the grim trigger or the penance strategy profile, standard analysis
indicates that we need only consider a single-period defection by a state.140 Suppose,
then, that all states other than i are Cooperating and that state i chooses to Defect against
group g in period 0.141 Its return from doing so is:
Gi (n, g : n 1) + Di (n, g : n 1)
SD =

Gi (n, g : n 1) +

i

i

1

with grim trigger
i

Li (n, g : n 1) + C i (n : n 1)

2
i

1

with penance
i

If, by contrast, state i chooses Cooperate in every period, its return is:
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SC =

C i (n : n 1)
1 i

For Cooperate to be preferable for state i, and therefore sustainable, we must have
SC > SD which, after some manipulation, requires:
Patience Condition:

S C > S D if and only if

i

>

g

p

Gi (n, g : n 1) C i (n : n 1)
with grim trigger
Gi (n, g : n 1) Di (n, g : n 1)
G (n, g : n 1) C i (n : n 1)
with penance.
= i
C i (n : n 1) Li (n, g : n 1)

=

The “Patience Condition” is that the actual discount factor ( i) exceeds the critical
discount factor ( *g or *p).
The first point to note is that, for the Patience Condition to hold, punishment of a
defector must be sufficiently large to affect the defector’s behavior. Consider, for
example, a case in which state i is “strong” while the states in g are “weak”, with the
result that the states in g have little ability to punish any defection by i: formally, Di Ci
Li. Then the Patience Condition is unlikely to be satisfied unless the states are “very”
patient. This suggests one of two outcomes. Either CIL will not be formed between such
states or the states will have to find some way of strengthening the punishment of
deviation. One possibility, for example, might be to create an independent arbiter who is
capable of coordinating multilateral punishment beyond g in the event that i defects.142
A necessary but not sufficient condition for cooperation to be sustainable is that
the critical discount factor is less than unity. Condition (iii) above gives the familiar
result that, with the grim trigger strategy, provided the participants to the potential rule
are sufficiently patient and the probability of continuation is sufficiently high, multilateral
cooperation is sustainable. This need not be the case with the penance strategy. This is
because p < 1 if and only if Ci(n: n – 1) > (Gi(n, g: n – 1) + Li(n, g: n – 1))/2. In other
words, the penance strategy will sustain cooperation by state i only if the single-period
return to cooperation exceeds the average of the single-period return to defection and
return while being punished.

It should not be thought, however, that grim trigger is necessarily a tougher
punishment regime than penance and so more able to sustain a cooperative rule. We note
that p < g if and only if Gi(n, g: n – 1) – Ci(n: n – 1) < Di(n, g: n – 1) – Li(n, g: n – 1),
in other words, if the gain to defection against g when all other states are cooperating is
142
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less than the gain to defection when the states in g retaliate. The Patience Condition
indicates that penance imposes a tougher punishment if the gain to defection when the
other states cooperate is less than the gain to defection when the other states defect.
The Patience Condition can be interpreted in other ways that are directly relevant
to our analysis. First, CIL is more likely to emerge and be sustainable when the returns to
cooperation are high relative to non-cooperation and when the returns to unilateral
defection are low. Second, CIL is more likely to be formed between relatively patient
states: those with relatively high discount factors. Third, CIL is more likely where the
probability of continued interaction between the participating states is high.
The important question to which we now turn is that raised by Goldsmith and
Posner. Does increasing the number of participants make it tougher to sustain
cooperation? For this to be the case it is necessary that * rises as n increases.143
With some manipulation we can show (suppressing n and g in the interests of
brevity) that
sign

sign
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We are interested in the signs of these derivatives: whether they are positive or negative
determines whether * rises as n increases. This is important since, the higher the critical
discount factor the less likely it is that the CIL rule is sustainable multilaterally. Note that
from (i) – (iii) above, all of the bracketed terms (Ci – Di) and so on are positive. It
* / n are determined by the signs of the
follows that the signs of the derivatives
derivatives of the payoffs with respect to the number of states in the multilateral rule.
The simplest, but probably least likely, case is that in which none of the pay-offs
are affected by n, that is dGi/dn = dDi/dn = dCi/dn = dLi/dn = 0. If this is the case, then
the multilateral CIL rule is no more than the aggregation of a series of independent
bilateral CIL rules and so is no more difficult to sustain than the individual bilateral rules.
It is more likely that the multilateral context has some force in that the number of
states that are effectively party to the multilateral CIL rule affects at least some of the
payoffs. This could arise if there is a public goods or network aspect to the establishment
of the CIL rule itself, a point to which we turn below, or more generally from the idea
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that the greater the number of states that form a CIL rule, the greater will be the aggregate
benefits that flow from that rule.
The situation that is most often considered has the following characteristics. First,
the return to each state from cooperation decreases as the number of states in the CIL rule
increases, so that dCi/dn < 0. Second, the return to a state from defection is greater when
there are more states that continue to abide by a CIL rule, so that dGi/dn > 0. Third, nonformulation of a CIL rule leaves states in an autarkic situation, so that the returns to nonformulation or total breakdown of a proposed CIL rule are the same and independent of
the number of states (dDi/dn 0). Where this is the case, it follows that the critical
discount factor is increasing in n so that multilateral CIL is, indeed, harder to sustain than
bilateral CIL.
This is, however, not the same as saying that such CIL rules are impossible to
sustain or even highly unlikely to be sustained. The critical condition is, as noted above,
that each state i that is party to the CIL rule has probability adjusted discount factor i >
*. This is more likely to arise if each state believes that the probability of continuation
i is high and has a high discount factor Ri. The implication is first, that we are more
likely to see multilateral CIL among states that have, and are expected to have,
interactions over an extended period. Second, multilateral CIL rules are more likely
between “patient” states, meaning states that tend to value future payoffs more highly
than others. Third, multilateral CIL rules are more likely to hold when the relevant
interactions are frequent. This is because Ri is a “per period” discount factor and i is a
“per period” probability. The shorter the time period between transactions the higher is
the effective probability adjusted discount factor and so the more likely it is that the i >
* condition will be satisfied.
Moreover, there are at three additional countervailing forces that can work to
sustain multilateral CIL.
The first follows from our analysis above. It is not difficult to imagine
circumstances in which the gains to unilateral defection fall with n while the share to
each state from cooperation increase with n--where dGi/dn < 0 and/or dCi/dn >0. Where
this is the case the conventional argument is actually reversed. Multilateral CIL rules are
easier to sustain than bilateral rules.
Under what circumstances might this arise? One possibility is that the rule relates
to the investment by each participating state in the provision of a public good. As more
states participate, the investment in provision increases as does the benefit to the
individual state from cooperation. By contrast, the gains from defection can be expected
to decrease with n. The same is likely to be true for policies with strong network effects
– for example, common international technology standards. A single state may gain from
going it alone but the potential gains are likely to be less the more isolated the state is,
that is, the more that the state looks like a single stand-out where others adopt a common
standard. A third possibility is that there are reputation effects built into Gi(n). A state
gains from defecting on a rule but the act of defection harms the state’s reputation,

making it less likely that the state will be able to make agreements with other states. In
the context of the game in Table 1, this implies that the gains from current defection will
tend to decrease with n.
The second countervailing effect arises when states are involved in a series of
international rules (including treaty rules) with overlapping groups of partners. In such a
case, defection on one rule has potentially harmful effects for all of the rules to which a
particular state is party. This is similar to the analysis of the potential for multimarket
contact to maintain tacit agreements between firms and is referred to as issue linkage in
the political science literature.144 Rather than provide a general analysis, the basic idea
can be illustrated by using a variant of one of the examples from Goldsmith and
Posner,145 assuming bilateral punishment and the grim trigger strategy profile.146 In this
game, cooperation by all states on a particular CIL rule gives each state a share 6/n.
Defection by all states gives each a share 4/n. Defection by a single state gives that state
4 and leaves the remaining states a share 2/n.
Suppose that there are 2 states, i.e. n = 2. Then the critical probability adjusted
discount factor above which a bilateral rule is sustainable is, from the Patience Condition:

g

(2) = 4

3 1
=
4 2 2

By contrast, if there are 4 states the critical discount factor to maintain a multilateral rule
between all four is:

g

(4) = 4

6/4 5
=
4 1
6

This case is, in other words, one in which the multilateral rule is more difficult to sustain
than the bilateral rule.
Now suppose that there are four states and that each state enters into a bilateral
rule or agreement with one of the other three states as well as a multilateral rule with all
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State j
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Attack
Ignore

The more general analysis is available on request.

Attack
2, 2
1, 4

State i
Ignore
4, 1
3, 3

four. Each rule has the pay-offs given in Table 2. Consider the following grim trigger
strategy.
1. Cooperate in period t if all states have Cooperated in all periods up to and
including t – 1;
2. Defect in period t and all subsequent periods on both rules if any state has
Defected on either rule in any period prior to t.
Clearly, if any state is going to Defect it will Defect on both the bilateral and
multilateral rules, since the strategy calls for its partner to react to defection by defecting
on both rules. The returns to the defecting state from defection are:
4+

2
1

+4+

1

=8+

3
1

The returns from continued cooperation are:
3
1

+

3
2(1

)

=

9
2(1

)

It follows that the critical probability adjusted discount factor above which the
multilateral and single bilateral rules are sustainable is
* (4,1) =

7
10

By the same argument, if a state enters into two bilateral rules and a four-state
multilateral rule, the probability adjusted critical discount factor is
* (4,2 ) =

9
14

Note that this example has the property that the critical probability adjusted
discount factor increases as the number of potential partner states increases, making the
multilateral CIL rule in this example more difficult to sustain as the number of
participants to the rule increases, as Goldsmith and Posner argue. However, our example
also illustrates the countervailing power that derives from states being able to enter into
bilateral as well as multilateral rules. In any multilateral context, the critical discount
factor decreases as the number of bilateral rules that each state enters into increases. This
leads to a simple but compelling proposition. A state can use slack enforcement power in
bilateral rules to sustain multilateral rules.
The third possibility is related to the second. Recall that the discount factor
relates to a particular period of time: the time between “transactions”. In other words, if
transactions occur every three months then * is a three-month discount factor, whereas if

transactions occur every month then * is a one-month discount factor. To see what this
means, consider once again the multilateral game with 4 states and assume that this game
is played every quarter. Then the critical quarterly probability adjusted discount factor
above which cooperation is sustainable is 5/6, or 83%. Now suppose that the game is
played every month. The critical monthly probability adjusted discount factor to sustain
cooperation is again 5/6 or 83%, but this is equivalent to a quarterly probability adjusted
discount factor of (5/6)3, or 58%. In other words, multilateral rules are more easily
sustained when they involve frequent interactions between the member states.
These two possibilities can, of course, interact. States may be able to enter into
multiple rules, some with frequent interaction and some with infrequent interaction. By
the same argument as above, a state can use slack enforcement power from rules with
frequent transactions to sustain rules with infrequent transactions.147
The implication of this analysis is that there exists a significant set of cases in
which it will be possible to form multilateral customary rules of international law. The
likelihood of formation in any particular circumstance will depend on a number of
factors, including (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of
states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states
involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, including
whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or
a network, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance and
defection, (v) the relative patience of states to realize benefits of long-term cooperation
compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the
frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other
multilateral relationships between the involved states.
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